Tea has never been merely a beverage; it has always been a story of commerce, politics and diplomacy.
Every morning, thousands of people across India and Nepal begin their day with a cup of tea. It is such an ordinary ritual that few stop to consider the journey behind it. Long before highways connected the Himalayas or governments negotiated trade agreements, tea crossed mountains on mule caravans, linked communities that were separated by borders, and quietly shaped the economic fortunes of those regions. It financed colonial expansion, transformed remote hill settlements into thriving plantation economies, and became woven into the social fabric of South Asia. Therefore, tea has never been merely a beverage; it has always been a story of commerce, politics and diplomacy.
On 1 May 2026, the Tea Board of India, in coordination with the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), enacted a stringent revision[1] to its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The revision made quality testing and certifications mandatory for all Nepali tea consignments, consequently bringing cross-border trade to a sudden standstill.[2] The economic consequences of this change were immediate and severe across the eastern Himalayan tea belt. Media reports said that by mid-June 2026, an estimated 1.3 million kilograms of processed orthodox tea was stranded in border customs warehouses and transport containers, subjecting the high-grade agricultural product to degradation. Facing acute liquidity constraints, a breakdown of the supply chain, and an inability to store accumulating inventory, approximately 83 orthodox tea processing factories and large estates suspended operations across the primary eastern production hubs of Ilam and Jhapa districts of Nepal.[3] This industrial shutdown directly disrupted the livelihoods of over 60,000 smallholder tea farmers, triggering widespread protests over the resulting economic distress across Koshi Province.[4]
Amidst these tensions, on 23 June 2026, bilateral diplomatic interventions prompted India’s FSSAI to ease import restrictions. The revised mandate includes a randomised 20 per cent inspection frequency for incoming tea cargo.[5] While authorities anticipate that this shift will accelerate customs clearance, reduce testing expenditures, and sustain market access, Nepali exporters remain apprehensive regarding unresolved systemic non-tariff trade barriers.
Nepal's Tea Industry and its Trade Relations with India
According to FNCCI President Anjan Shrestha, at present, Nepal's tea sector generates an annual turnover of NPR 12–14 billion (USD 78–91 million), reflecting its significant contribution to the country's economy.[6] The industry serves as a vital economic pillar for rural livelihoods and formal employment across the country. The report on “Status of Smallholder Farmers and Workers in Nepal’s Tea Sector (2023)” states Nepal employs roughly 60,000 workers, with women comprising nearly 50 per cent of the hand-plucking workforce in the highlands.[7] At the macroeconomic level, the tea sector independently accounts for approximately 0.06 per cent of Nepal’s GDP. It is a major driver of foreign exchange earnings, yielding a record-high Rs 3.9 billion[8] in annual export revenues.
Tea cultivation spans over 20,700 hectares of land across 170 commercial estates and 120 processing units, presenting a strict geographic duopoly based on elevation and botanical variety.[9] The lowland subtropical plains of the Jhapa District utilise capital-intensive corporate estates to generate nearly 75 per cent of national volume through mechanised Crush, Tear, Curl (CTC) tea, which functions as the lifeblood of domestic culture by supplying 95 per cent of internal consumption.[10] Conversely, the alpine mid-hills of the eastern region, specifically the state-declared "Tea Zones" of Ilam, Panchthar, Dhankuta, and Terhathum,[11] command the remaining 25 per cent of production[12], relying on agrarian cooperatives to hand-pluck premium whole-leaf Orthodox Black, Green, Oolong, and rare White teas strictly targeted towards premium international markets.
This production pattern has its origins in the colonial era, when British India expanded commercial tea cultivation in Darjeeling to reduce its dependence on Chinese tea and deploy tea as a geoeconomic instrument. Nepal subsequently established the Ilam Tea Estate in 1863 using Chinese tea saplings gifted to the Rana administration.[13] However, under the Rana regime's isolationist policies, the absence of domestic processing facilities forced Nepalese farmers to export raw green tea leaves to factories in Darjeeling. This dependence gradually declined after the 1951 democratic transition with the establishment of Nepal's first processing plants in Ilam and Soktim in 1978, followed by the creation of the National Tea and Coffee Development Board (NTCDB) in 1993.[14]
In 2024, despite generating USD 33.2 million in export revenue[15], the sector suffers from severe monopolistic dependency, as India absorbs around 90 per cent of all outbound shipment[16]. According to the National Tea and Coffee Development Board, Nepal exports approximately 15,600 tonnes of tea annually, of which 86 per cent goes to India, while premium third-country markets such as Germany, Japan, and the United States account for less than 9 per cent combined.[17]
Current Challenges
In a major policy shift, on 10 February 2026, the Tea Board of India issued Directive No. 01/2026, acting under the mandate of the Tea (Distribution and Export) Control Order, 2005.[18] This regulatory shift followed the specific recommendations of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce, outlined in its 194th report dated 12 August 2025, which raised concerns over rising tea imports and heightened risks of product adulteration. The primary aim of this directive was to establish a rigorous quality control mechanism to protect the domestic tea ecosystem and defend the premium brand equity of Indian-origin tea. From New Delhi’s policy standpoint, the directive was a delayed response to systemic regulatory loopholes. The decision to mandate physical sampling was anchored in two primary institutional justifications[19]:
1. Preserving Geographical Indication (GI) Integrity: The domestic Indian tea industry, particularly in the Darjeeling hills, has faced severe economic distress due to declining yields and rising production costs. The influx of structurally similar, lower-cost Nepali orthodox tea—often blended surreptitiously with genuine Darjeeling tea and re-exported—diluted the global premium value of India's GI brand. Mandatory labeling and the 50 per cent value-addition rule were legitimate legal mechanisms to enforce intellectual property protection.
2. Harmonising Food Safety Oversight: The 2025 Parliamentary Standing Committee report highlighted a genuine regulatory gap: between 2018 and 2026, the automated online clearance system effectively bypassed physical biosafety verifications. In an era of heightened global compliance, allowing unmonitored agricultural inflows created a risk of pesticide residue or adulteration entering the Indian consumer pool, necessitating a return to physical testing.
In fact, in November 2021, the Tea Board of India initiated an inquiry following complaints by regional planter associations against Tata Consumer Products Limited (TCPL), India.[20] The complaints alleged that the company purchased cheaper orthodox tea from Nepal, blended it with Indian varieties, and marketed the mix under premium labels like Tata Tea Gold without disclosing its multi-origin nature. While the company stated that it legally purchased its supply through domestic auctions, local growers argued that this blending practice undercut the market, depressed auction prices, and damaged the economic viability of authentic Darjeeling estates.[21] Therefore, by leveraging these stringent sanitary and phytosanitary parameters to insulate domestic producers from import competition, the directive was perceived by many Nepali stakeholders as a non-tariff barrier to trade. However, this sudden regulatory transition instantly exposed severe structural deficiencies in cross-border logistics and testing infrastructure.
Structural Problems and Way Ahead
The recurring Indo-Nepal border trade crises reveal a fragile value chain where geopolitical asymmetries and regulatory friction systematically penalize farmers on both sides of the frontier. This vulnerability was acutely demonstrated in mid-2026 through a dual paradigm of agricultural disruption. While India’s stringent tea directive paralyzed the economy of Eastern Nepal, a parallel counter-friction emerged along the border when Nepal restricted entry to Indian mango consignments[22] over concerns regarding excessive chemical pesticide residues. Though ostensibly framed around public health safety, the timing of Kathmandu's border restrictions mirrored a form of strategic reciprocity in technical barriers to trade. However, the disruption was brief, and this swift bilateral adjustment underlines a broader structural reality in the sub-continent: while both nations increasingly leverage sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) parameters as tactical diplomatic levers, the deep economic interdependence of the borderlands ultimately forces a pragmatic regulatory retreat to prevent total supply-chain collapse.
The chairperson of the Nepal Tea Association, Kamal Mainali, highlighted, “that Nepal's lack of independent, accredited quality assurance infrastructure, leaving local exporters unable to contest FSSAI phytosanitary claims. When Indian authorities mandate comprehensive chemical and residue tests, samples are rerouted to Kolkata, delaying transit by 14 to 25 days.” He also revealed the exact logistical gridlock behind this process, explaining that “even when a risk-based sampling system flags only 20 out of 100 consignments for laboratory testing, the remaining 80 unselected trucks were stranded at the border, unable to secure line clearance until the flagged samples return from distant facilities.”[23] Moreover, he said that India does not recognize the laboratory certificates issued by Nepal.
Similarly, Founder & Chairman of the Central Tea Cooperative Federation (CTCF) Nepal, Govinda Prasad Dahal, also identified this institutional deficit as the core issue and noted that “Nepal needs its own internationally recognized tea testing and quality certification system. Although a Tea Testing Centre has been established in Suryodaya Municipality, it is still not fully operational. Farmers and exporters should not have to depend on foreign laboratories for quality testing and certification.”[24] In order to address this, both governments need to develop joint testing laboratories within Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) that can host staff from both countries and provide dual-signature certification to eliminate the geopolitical friction of unilateral testing.
Importantly, Nepal’s policy environment worsens the vulnerability by penalizing local producers before their crop even travels. As the CTCF Chairman explained, “the state frequently treats organic certification and cooperative farming as taxable liabilities rather than strategic national assets. Organic tea producers face multiple compounding costs, including VAT, certification fees, heavy banking charges, and localized taxes, all of which drain the thin profit margins of smallholder cooperatives and leave them with zero cash reserves to absorb unexpected trade shocks.”[25]This creates a strategic vulnerability loop, wherein selling illegal raw tea products directly to Indian agents through open border —even at depressed, sub-optimal prices—bypasses the entire logjammed domestic infrastructure.
Resolving this dependency requires shifting from diplomatic firefighting to structural, sovereign trade autonomy. First, the state must operationalize the Suryodaya Municipality Tea Testing Centre, ideally managing it through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) with a global testing firm to guarantee political neutrality. Securing international accreditation for this facility would enable formal Government-to-Government (G2G) and Business-to-Business (B2B) agreements with New Delhi for reciprocal certificate recognition, establishing fast-tracked customs lanes that completely bypass border testing loops.
Simultaneously, the Ministry of Finance in Nepal should replace extractive taxes with targeted support for organic growers. Converting VAT and banking charges into direct subsidies for international organic recertification and sustainable inputs would immediately lower production costs and allow cooperatives to build resilient cash reserves. Finally, the National Tea and Coffee Development Board (NTCDB) of Nepal must help factories transition away from single auction pools by establishing dedicated R&D centers to upgrade production standards to meet global quality baselines. As Mainali noted, “many producers may not have the technical knowledge or the capacity to promote their products themselves. Therefore, the government should play a greater role in facilitating marketing and market access”[26]. This technical upgrade requires proactive diplomatic backing, "exploring other international markets as well. Nepal's ambassadors in different countries should be more active in promoting Nepali tea and creating opportunities for dialogue. Developing the industry alone is not enough; the government also needs to support marketing efforts. “This expansion must be supported by targeted, long-term capital investments, specifically "from banks in tea plantations workers to support the long-term growth of the industry.”[27]
Conclusion
The recurring impasse in the India–Nepal tea trade illustrates that technical border regulations are not merely instruments of quality control but are closely intertwined with broader political and economic considerations. For Nepal, stricter import testing requirements highlight the vulnerabilities of a landlocked economy that relies heavily on the Indian market and transit routes. For India, the regulations reflect efforts to safeguard a domestic tea industry, particularly in West Bengal, where producers face relatively high labour and compliance costs. Industry stakeholders contend that rising imports of lower-cost Nepali tea could depress auction prices and undermine the premium value associated with Darjeeling's Geographical Indication (GI) status.
Resolving this bilateral trade crisis requires an institutional shift from unilateral trade defense toward collaborative regulatory governance. While temporary border relaxations offer only transient relief for Nepal's agrarian base, prolonged restriction risks alienating a strategically vital neighbor and accelerating Kathmandu’s push for sovereign trade diversification. A sustainable solution lies in establishing shared regulatory mechanisms, such as co-managed cross-border testing facilities, which can protect public health and local brand integrity without compromising the economic stability of the shared Himalayan corridor.
[1] Binod Dhakal, “How India’s Testing Rules Have Pushed Nepal’s Orthodox Tea Industry to the Brink”, Nepal News,
[2] Ibid.
[3] Parbat Portel, “Indian Restrictions halt Nepali Tea Exports, forcing Factory Closures”, The Kathmandu Post, 14 June 2026
[4] “Tea Industry and Plantations Have Been Shut Down for a Week, Affecting the Livelihoods of 60,000 Workers”, EKantipur, 22 June 2026, https://ekantipur.com/news/2026/06/22/en/tea-industry-and-plantations-have-been-shut-down-for-a-week-workers-livelihoods-affected-58-54.html
[5] Anil Giri & Krishana Prasain, “Tea Exports to India to Ease as it Softens Quality Inspection Rules”, The Kathmandu Post, 27 June 2026
[6] Nepal News, Foreign Minister Khanal initiates diplomatic dialogues with India to resolve tea export hurdles, 20 June 2026, https://english.nepalnews.com/s/diplomacy/foreign-minister-khanal-initiates-diplomatic-dialogues-with-india-to-resolve-tea-export-hurdles/
[7] Shrestha, “Nepal Tea Report: Status of Smallholder Farmers and Workers in Tea Sector”, South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication, March 2023
[8] Foreign Trade Statistics for FY 2082/83, Ministry of Finance, Government of Nepal, 2026
[9] Statistics of Tea, National Tea and Coffee Development Board, Government of Nepal
[10] Ibid.
[11] Tea History, National Tea and Coffee Development Board, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
[12] Statistics of Tea, National Tea and Coffee Development Board, Government of Nepal
[13] History of Nepal Tea, Gurkha Tea, 2016
[14] Tea History, National Tea and Coffee Development Board, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development
[16] Parbat Portel and Krishana Prashain, India again blocks tea exports, intends to prevent traders from buying, Kantipur, 5 June 2025
[17] Prem Adhikari, “India’s import rules eclipse Nepali Tea Market”, The Rising Nepal, 1 May 2026
[18] Tea Board of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, 10 February 2026
[19] Ibid.
[20] Sambit Saha, “Ban on Blending of Darjeeling Tea with Nepal Variety lifted”, The Telegraph, 20 July 2026
[21] Ibid.
[22] “Nepal Govt Restricts Imports of Mangoes from India”, The Economic Times, 9 June 2026
[23] Kamal Mainali, Chairperson, Nepal Tea Association, interview by author, Kathmandu, 24 June 2026.
[24] Govinda Prasad Dahal, Founder and Chairman, Central Tea Cooperative Federation (CTCF) Nepal, interview by author, Kathmandu, 2 July 2026.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Kamal Mainali, Chairperson, Nepal Tea Association, interview by author, Kathmandu, 24 June 2026.
[27] Ibid.